Friday, March 19, 2010

Using ssh-agent with an encfs encrypted home folder

Passwords and pass-phrases are an authentication method; they authenticate the user as the only one, at least in theory, who knows the correct phrase. With encryption tools, they serve an additional purpose; they either generate the symmetric key directly through one or more hashes (eg. cryptsetup), or they decrypt an existing stored key (eg. LUKS, GnuPG).

SSH2 public key authentication is purely an authentication method. There is no symmetric key involved. The requester (eg. sshd) generates a challenge, sends it to the client or agent for a signature using the private key, and verifies the signed response using the public key. If the public key successfully decrypts the signature, the private key must have generated it, and thus the user, as the only one with access to the private key, in theory, is authenticated.

I recently worked with someone who was encrypting their home folder on a remote system with pam-encfs, but wanted to use public key authentication for the initial SSH authentication, rather than an interactive password. The first problem with remotely accessing encrypted home folders via SSH is with the authorized_keys file. This file is normally in the user's home directory, and thus inaccessible until the user logs in and decrypts it. There are known ways around that, at least, such as placing the file outside of the user's home directory.

The second problem is generating the decryption key. When using SSH public key authentication, there is no password for pam-encfs to use to generate the symmetric key. Since the authentication task is passed back to the ssh client or agent, the password is never present on the remote system.

Stepping back for a moment, pam-encfs does seem to be the logical place to decrypt and mount the file-system. It has the advantage of PAM's modular design, and knows when the session start and session stop events occur to mount/umount it. Plus, at least with interactive logins, PAM already has access to the user's pass-phrase, and can pass that to encfs without needing a second prompt.

Not so with public key authentication, unfortunately. There is no way to uncover the symmetric key without this pass-phrase or the key material that is generated from it. So the question becomes, while authenticating the user via the SSH agent, how can we access a pass-phrase for encfs? It must be stored somewhere, with agent authentication used to authorize access to it. I've come up with a couple of ideas, neither of which I'm thrilled with.

Hold password in trusted keyring with access authorized by agent

This would require a keyring of some sort on the remote system which maintains the password. If it encrypts the password, it would still need to be able to decrypt it locally upon authorized requests, so has all the problems of a classic DRM system.

Pro: No calls to external systems needed
Con: Passphrase or hash is stored on the system which uses it
Con: Requires a trusted keyring on the system

Retrieve the password from an SSH "key store" using SSH agent

The system holding the private key is the most trusted platform in this scenario. This platform could also host the password, and release it on an authorized SSH connection authenticated using its own private key. This key storing/serving SSH server could run on a non-standard port and be limited to just the one host and key and just return the required passphrase instead of opening a shell.

Encfs has a parameter to specify a command which returns the plaintext password on stdout. With a little patching and scripting, pam-encfs could be modified to make a call back to the originating server for the password.

Pro: Can be compatible with interactive logins by storing same password
Pro: Only requires a pam-encfs patch and a few scripts
Con: Password exists in plaintext on the key store
Con: Additional complexity, with no fallback on failure

Modify encfs to take raw key option, and retrieve from "key store"

Since the only thing the remote system needs the pass-phrase for is to generate the symmetric key, we could avoid exposing the pass-phrase entirely by storing that key instead of the pass-phrase. Then, we retrieve that key and apply it directly in order to mount the encrypted file-system.

Pro: Can be compatible with interactive logins by using same password
Pro: Password is not stored in any format, only its hash
Con: Likely also requires encfs patch to take raw symmetric key as an option
Con: Even more complexity, still no fallback on failure

Either of the above two, but with encrypted store
We could require two things for access to the plaintext pass-phrase/key: the encrypted pass-phrase/key from the keystore, and a symmetric key stored on the system which uses it. This would prevent a compromise of the originating machine from directly leading to the plaintext, at the cost of more complexity.

Pro: Pass-phrase/key not stored in plaintext
Con: Even more complexity

Modify PAM (conf?) to require password after public key

This may turn out to be the best solution. If the existing modules can be configured such that sshd authenticates via public key, but PAM still requires a password, then pam-encfs has what it needs to create the symmetric key, and all is well. If this is not a configuration issue, it may require a patch to one of the PAM modules, sshd, or login. It requires two passwords: one to unlock the private key (or login), and one to decrypt the file system.

Pro: 100% compatible with interactive logins
Pro: Password is not stored in any form, no less secure than interactive login
Pro: At best, a config option. At worst, one of the PAM modules may need a patch
Pro: Increased security, as a key AND a pass-phrase is required for remote access
Con: defeats SSO capabilities of SSH agent authentication

The user's solution

The solution that was implemented is to mount the file-system outside of PAM using the shell's login/logout scripts. This has a few potential problems, such as concurrency issues if the user connects more than once, and the inability to execute commands directly from the ssh client. However, it gives a uniform experience whether connecting remotely or at the console, and in fact allows different passwords for login and decryption.

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Using an SSH agent for sudo authentication

I've discovered a great PAM module for using an SSH agent to authenticate the user for sudo access. I'm planning on installing it on all of my Linux servers.

To build in Ubuntu 8.04.4 LTS, you'll need to install a couple of development packages:
sudo apt-get install libpam0g-dev libssl-dev
Then download the source from
http://sourceforge.net/projects/pamsshagentauth/

The build process is your typical "./configure; make; sudo make install" but requires a little tweeking before install. So first run
./configure; make
The manpage is NROFF formatted, but installed as a text page. To overcome this, I changed both references in the Makefile from "cat" to "man" with my favorite editor.

Additionally, the PAM modules in Ubuntu are installed in /lib/security, whereas make installs by default to /usr/local/libexec. You can manually modify the libexecdir value in the makefile, or set the variable when calling make install, such as
sudo make libexecdir=/lib/security install
I used sudo checkinstall instead in order to build a simple binary .deb file for distributing among my servers. See here for details.

Once installed, change the line in /etc/pam.d/sudo from
@include common-auth
to
auth sufficient pam_ssh_agent_auth.so \
file=%h/.ssh/authorized_keys
auth requisite pam_unix.so nullok_secure
That allows PAM to use the SSH agent. Finally, in order to pass the agent socket to sudo, add the following line before the env_reset line in /etc/sudoers
Defaults env_keep += SSH_AUTH_SOCK
To test, you will have to be running an agent such as Pageant (part of the PuTTY tools) or ssh-agent from OpenSSH, and you will have to connect with the agent forwarding flag (-A). To verify you're reauthenticating instead of using cached sudo credentials, run
sudo -K
to clear the user timestamp. Then, run
sudo id
and check the /var/log/auth.log file for a line like
sudo[5678]: pam_ssh_agent_auth: Authenticated: `and1' as `and1' using /home/and1/.ssh/authorized_keys

Now, why did we do all of this?

Authenticating through an SSH agent means the password is never entered on the remote system. The authentication request is sent back to the originating computer running the agent. The request signed by the user's private key which is held by the agent, and then returned to the remote system to verify using the user's public key.

If the remote system is compromised, using this module will prevent the attacker from ever seeing your password while you access the system and escalate your privileges to admin.

If the PAM module is set to sufficient, it will fall back to prompting for a password. If you set it to required and remove the pam_unix.so line, it should then only allow agent authentication, much like setting "PasswordAuthentication no" in sshd_config. WARNING: I haven't verified this, so make sure you have an alternative means of gaining root access before you fiddle with it...

Once this module is in place, there is no reason to have a password on the remote account. You could set it to '*' or a long, random string and forget it. In fact, it also gives the ability to issue privileged commands remotely, such as
ssh -A myRemoteSystem sudo shutdown -r now
Note that you have to use an agent; specifying the identity on the ssh command line will not work, as the followup request from sudo will not be serviced. The -i command to ssh will only authenticate the original login request.

There is one caveat, true of all agent forwarding. If the remote system is compromised, the attacker will have access to your authentication socket as long as you're logged in. This means he would be able to connect to systems where that key is authorized using your agent forwarding socket.

You can mitigate this using OpenSSH by using the -c option to ssh-add when adding your private key. When used this way, your local system will popup a dialog asking you to authorize each use of the private key. I don't know of a way to do this with PuTTY without patching Pageant.